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Opportunism in buyer-supplier exchange: a critical examination of the concept and its 
implications for theory and practice 
 
Abstract 
 
Claims that opportunism is widespread in the process of buyer-supplier exchange are 
commonplace, but direct supporting evidence for such claims is largely absent from the 
relevant literatures. This paper offers a critique of the treatment of opportunism in supply 
chains by re-establishing the importance of guile in the concept, and investigates existing 
published, empirical measures of buyer and supplier opportunistic behaviour. The paper 
offers evidence that, despite the frequency with which the concept is discussed in the 
literature and applied in research, and the emphasis given to the risks it generates for 
management, opportunism with guile between buyers and suppliers appears to be rare in 
practice. This paper is the first critical assessment of the concept’s treatment in the 
Operations Management field, and it argues that practitioners are currently being poorly 
advised with respect to the phenomenon, as well as drawing conclusions for both 
practitioners and researchers that differ radically from the prevailing consensus on the 
subject. 
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Opportunism in buyer-supplier exchange: a critical examination of the concept and its 
implications for theory and practice     
1. Introduction 
 
Buyer-supplier relationships exist between firms to ensure that goods and services can be 
bought and sold in the most effective and efficient manners. Opportunism is deemed a 
behaviour that runs contrary to these aims and management devotes considerable time and 
resources in creating mechanisms to mitigate against it. The purpose of this article is to 
critically assess the current tr atments of the concept of opportunism in relevant literatures by 
examining existing empirical evidence relating to the phenomenon and reflects the concerns 
that whilst opportunism is widely researched, it is rarely the central focus of much research 
and is consequently not completely understood (Hawkins et al. 2013). The specific focus of 
this article is an exploration of the role of opportunism with guile in buyer-supplier 
relationships, as this phenomenon is not explicitly considered by other theories or views and 
provides the contribution of this article. 
 
The paper builds on research, which evaluates the presumption of the prevalence of 
opportunism in buyer-supplier exchanges (Hawkins et al, 2008) and questions the pervasive 
character of opportunism assumed by proponents of Transaction Economic theory 
(Moschandreas, 1997). Given the importance accorded to opportunism in business related 
research (Hawkins et al. 2013), we attempt to re-establish the significance of “guile” in 
Williamson’s (1985) initial thesis of opportunism in his development of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). In so doing the paper highlights methodological and survey design factors 
that may influence data gathering and interpretation of the phenomenon (Crosno and 
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Dahlstrom, 2008). The practical aim of the paper is to ensure that management responses to 
the possible risks of opportunistic behaviour between buyers and suppliers match the 
magnitude of the threat the phenomenon poses. In the event of a mismatch, inappropriate 
management decisions may result. From an educational perspective and in line with Ketokivi 
and Mahoney (2016, p. 136), we suggest that “a thorough understanding can help us take 
TCE to the classroom in a constructive manner.”  
 
We argue that opportunism is central to TCE and widely used in the analysis of buyer-
supplier exchange relationship, although we acknowledge other theoretical perspectives could 
provide rival explanations of the phenomenon. The analysis that follows will be of particular 
value to researchers and practitioners with an interest in or responsibility for supply chain 
performance.  The paper analyses the literature on opportunism from different academic 
fields to address three main questions: 
• Is opportunism with guile common in buyer-supplier exchange? 
• Are different forms of opportunism of equal importance to practitioners?  
• Is opportunism a serious problem that demands significant management 
attention?  
 
The current consensus in a variety of fields including Operations (OM), Marketing and 
Purchasing & Supply Management (P&SM) is that opportunism is a commonplace, 
significant threat to companies engaged in buyer-supplier exchange. However, this paper will 
show, through an evaluation of direct and indirect evidence, that the enactment of 
Williamson’s (1985) original definition of opportunism with guile is not as common as the 
academic literature purports it to be. The contribution of this paper is threefold: 
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I. A more critical treatment of opportunism, which more precisely defines the concept 
of guile and its role in opportunistic behaviour, allows us to more clearly differentiate 
between truly opportunistic behaviours and those that are overt in nature or are the 
results of mistakes, lack of knowledge and experience on the part of the supplier. 
Establishing the key role of guile therefore questions the pervasiveness of 
opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships.    
II. This more precise view of guile means that practising purchasing managers can focus 
their managerial control activities on truly opportunistic behaviours and that 
extraordinary supplier evaluation and monitoring efforts are not required to provide 
protection from the effects of the opportunism. Practitioners can then more usefully 
devote these resources to more effective activities such as dealing with global and 
technological challenges resulting from an increasing reliance on digitalisation and 
the need to deal with more complex data. 
III. Academic research, meanwhile, might usefully focus on both improving the construct 
validity of methods of measuring opportunism, and devising means of dealing with 
the epistemological difficulties of obtaining valid empirical responses, in order to 
arrive at a more accurate assessment of the actual incidence of the phenomenon. 
Further, the continued attribution of opportunism to more ‘innocent’ supplier 
behaviour results in the circular argument that opportunism is rife, which is inhibiting 
the development of trust and openness in buyer-supplier relationships.   
 
The paper proceeds with an examination of the meaning of the term ‘opportunism’ in buyer-
supplier exchange, a review of the treatment of the phenomenon in a variety of literatures, 
and a critical analysis of the direct and indirect empirical evidence for the prevalence of 
buyer-supplier opportunism. This analysis results in the establishment of the lack of 
Page 4 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tppc E-mail: ppc@plymouth.ac.uk
Production Planning & Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
5 
 
consideration of the role of guile in defining opportunistic behaviour and concludes with the 
finding that the phenomenon is not sufficiently common to warrant the currently 
recommended levels of management attention.  
 
2. The foundations of opportunism in the literature 
 
The concept of opportunism employed in OM stems from microeconomic theory, where it 
was introduced by Oliver Williamson to help explain the emergence of firms from pure 
market trading. Opportunism is an assumption at the heart of Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) and defined by Williamson as: ‘…self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1985, 
p.47). Because of its contribution to the understanding of the make-or-buy decision process in 
companies, the concept is of particular interest to the OM, P&SM and Marketing fields where 
the largest number of published references is to be found. However, the term is employed 
widely in a variety of other fields: Organisation Science (Conner & Prahalad, 1996), Finance 
(Douglas, 2007), Strategy (John, 2001), Human Resource Management (Lepak & Snell, 
1999). Close examination reveals that the usage of the term in the literature frequently does 
not match Williamson's (1985) original, idiosyncratic and deliberately narrow definition 
which he devised in order to explain the emergence of firms from the market. It will be 
argued that changes in the definition and flaws in the methods used to measure the concept 
have reduced the validity of empirical data, and practitioner advice derived from such studies 
may thus generate a misallocation of management resources.   
 
The paper focuses on opportunism in buyer-supplier exchanges, and in particular analyses a 
small number of papers that offer direct and indirect evidence of the prevalence of buyer and 
supplier opportunism. Before the discussion narrows down to the empirical evidence of the 
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frequency with which the phenomenon may be encountered, a brief overview summarising its 
treatment in the literatures from which those papers are drawn is offered to provide a context 
for that evidence. This section also establishes the key role that guile plays in opportunism 
and how its usage has developed from Williamson’s original establishment of the concept.   
 
2.1 Definitions of opportunism 
 
The concept of opportunism refers to a feature of human behaviour rather than a technical, 
abstract economics concept, and the following discussion thus begins with general semantics 
and English usage. The dictionary definition of the word is relatively straightforward, 
opportunism is: 
 
The art, policy, or practice of taking advantage of opportunities or circumstances 
often with little regard for principles or consequences.  
(Merriam-Webster.com, 2014) 
Or: 
 
The policy of doing what is opportune or at the time expected…often used to imply 
sacrifice of principle or an undue spirit of accommodation to present circumstances. 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 865) 
 
The dictionary definition thus focuses on the taking of some kind of advantage involving a 
transgression against some principle, with an element of chance rather than deliberate 
planning. The definition devised by Williamson (1985) in Economics differs in several 
respects: 
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By opportunism I mean self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely 
limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing and cheating. Opportunism more 
often involves subtle forms of deceit. [and]….more generally, opportunism refers to 
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 47) 
 
 The dictionary definition of ‘guile’ meanwhile is:   
 
Insidious cunning, deceit, treachery. 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 934) 
 
Thus, in Williamson’s  (1985) version, the advantage being taken is self-interest and the main 
principles being violated (as his analysis indicates) are the business norms of being truthful 
and honouring contracts.  Such relational norms are said to reduce opportunism as they are 
expectations about behaviour and govern exchange relationships between firms (Heide and 
John, 1992). The element of chance or lack of planning present in the dictionary definition is 
replaced with the opposite notion of deliberate planning or intent. Furthermore, because 
deliberately failing to honour a contract is very widely disapproved of in business, and 
dishonesty is met with opprobrium in both business and wider society, the perpetrators of this 
form of opportunism need to employ guile or deceit, and the behaviour is thus conducted in 
secret. When applied to buyer-supplier exchange the differences between the open or overt 
and secretive versions of the concept can be illustrated with reference to a buyer faced with a 
price increase from a supplier and this is shown in Table 1: 
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Concept Behaviour Illustrative example 
Overt opportunism 
 
 
The open pursuit of 
advantage or benefit by one 
party to an exchange at the 
expense of their trading 
opposite(s). 
The supplier forces a price 
increase through without 
offering any justification. 
 
Opportunism-with-
guile 
 
 
The hidden pursuit of 
advantage or benefit, with 
the deliberate intent to 
deceive, by one party to an 
exchange at the expense of 
their trading opposite(s). 
The supplier requests a 
price increase citing 
deliberately distorted data 
in justification, and hides 
the distortion. 
 
Table 1 – Example of the overt and with-guile forms of opportunism (source – authors) 
 
A supplier might employ Overt-opportunism if they were, for example, indifferent towards a 
buyer and did not care if they kept or lost their business. Suppliers keen to retain a buyer’s 
business might also behave like this if they recognised that the buyer was so dependent on 
their output that they could demand whatever they liked without fear of losing the buyer’s 
business. 
 
2.2 Current usage of opportunism - the effects of definition choice 
 
Firstly, we look at whether the concept of opportunism has been critically treated in the OM 
and Marketing literature, before going on to look at its empirical usage in sections 3.1 and 
3.2. One might argue that in an OM paper, it is inappropriate to include data from Marketing 
studies. However, that field has made many more measurements of the phenomenon than any 
other to date, and their omission would have produced an indefensible narrowing of the 
analysis. Moreover, although they employ a different perspective, the Marketing studies 
examine the same phenomenon as those in OM, P&SM and other fields. Many, use precisely 
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the same measures in collecting data. Indeed, the concept of opportunism has been 
enthusiastically embraced by the two fields, as a search using the term “opportunism” in the 
Google Scholar and Summon search engines, and the EBSCO Business Premier and Emerald 
databases generated a list of likely target journals (see Table 2 below). These journals were 
considered to be the most relevant as taken from the Associated Business Schools (ABS) 
Journal Quality, and the search using “opportunism” generated a combined total of 1486 
papers referring to the phenomenon. 
 
Operations Management 
 
Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, Production, Planning and Control, Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, Supply Chain Management an International Journal, Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, Journal of Production and Operations Management, Journal of Production 
Economics, International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, Journal 
of Business logistics, International Journal of Logistics Management, Decision Sciences, 
European Journal of Operational Research 
 
Marketing 
 
Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of International Marketing, Psychology and 
Marketing, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Marketing 
Letters, Marketing Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Marketing, 
European Journal of Marketing 
 
Other managerial areas 
 
Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, British Journal of Management, Journal of Management 
 
Table 2 – Relevant journals referring to the concept of opportunism 
 
The papers were divided between the three researchers to scan for evidence of any critical 
and focused treatment of the concept of “opportunism” and this process identified 37 papers 
(as seen in Appendix A). Surprisingly, these contain only a few critical observations relating 
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to the concept, as the focus is of these papers is on empirical measurement of the 
phenomenon. One early work (John, 1984) argued that, contrary to Williamson’s claims: 
‘…unrestrained self-interest maximization is not characteristic of human behaviour…’ (1985, 
p. 278). The concept is widely referred to, and, in common with other fields, the dominant 
treatment is that of a problem requiring managing or minimizing, for example: Liu et al. 
(2010b, p. 844); Cavusgil et al. (2004, p. 8); Brown et al. (2000, p. 51). Thus Handley & 
Benton (2012) comment on the challenges that have been made to Williamson’s claim that 
opportunism is an innate human characteristic (Williamson, 1985, p. 56), and Gulbrandsen et 
al. (2009) deserve mention for referring to weaknesses in the original theory concerning the 
effects of opportunism and mechanisms for influencing it. In general, however, the concept 
has become so familiar that, with the exception of empirical papers employing the concept as 
a variable for measurement, references to it are usually made in passing, and the treatment is 
predominantly uncritical. The norm is for opportunism to be presented as a problem 
demanding management attention. For example, Cadden et al. (2015) show that opportunistic 
behaviour by the buyer (such as price renegotiation in situations of increased buying 
volumes) may result in reciprocal behaviour from the supplier (in the form of contract 
renegotiations in situations of decreasing buyer volumes) or that behaviour could be 
construed by one party as being opportunistic, e.g. in Chen et al. (2016) price increases from 
the supplier due to holidays were not believed by the buyer. Although such examples are 
nonetheless rigorous in the establishment of links between behaviour and interpretation and 
extend the scope of what may be considered opportunistic behaviour, introducing contextual 
matters into the discussion, they do not question the fundamental definition of opportunism 
used. 
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Perhaps the most widely cited and hence influential, theoretical source that informs many of 
the later studies of the phenomenon in the OM and Marketing fields is Wathne & Heide 
(2000) which has been cited in 374 publications (Scopus, accessed June 15, 2015, 
www.scopus.com). They begin with Williamson’s ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ 
definition, and drawing on Masten (1988), describe it as "strong form" or “blatant” 
opportunism (Wathne & Heide, 2000, p. 38). Given the importance of secrecy in 
Williamson’s (1985) definition, the latter term is particularly inappropriate. They subdivide 
opportunism into two forms:  
 
For example, opportunism in the form of quality shirking means that a party is 
withholding efforts, or passively failing to honor an agreement. In contrast, breaching 
a distribution contract by selling in an unauthorized territory involves an active effort. 
Wathne & Heide, 2000, pp. 36-7 [emphasis in original] 
 
Both of the examples they refer to may involve the deliberate use of deceit. They also draw 
on Macneil (1981) in the Law field, and employ his alternative definition of opportunism: 
"Self-interest seeking contrary to the principles of the relation in which it occurs." (Macneil, 
1981, p. 1024). Unfortunately, their analysis loses clarity when they repeat a typing error in a 
footnote in Macneil’s work (see Macneil, 1981, 1023), thus: “…a necessary starting point is a 
delineation of the term ‘guile’ which [Macneil] defines as “taking advantage of opportunities 
with little regard for principles or consequences.” (Wathne & Heide, 2000, p. 39). Those 
words, however, clearly derive from the Merriam-Webster definition (above) of opportunism 
not guile, and by transcribing this error they accidentally drop guile from their formal 
analysis and never clearly state their position on the behaviour. However, since some of the 
examples they subsequently discuss display guile and some do not, one may infer that 
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Wathne & Heide’s (2000) treatment embraces both the with-guile and overt forms. Finally, 
whereas Williamson’s (1985) theory focused narrowly on the violation of the principles of 
telling the truth and the honouring of contracts, Wathne & Heide (2000) introduce a variety 
of other principles that may be violated including: ‘the expectation of sharing benefits and 
burdens’, ‘restraints on unilateral use of power’, ‘general norms of equity’, ‘distributive 
justice’, ‘broad bargaining norms’ and ‘flexibility’ which they define as the ‘shared 
expectation that parties will adapt to changing circumstances’ (p. 40).  
 
It is self-evidently possible to devise any number of specialised definitions of the concept of 
opportunism. Williamson (1985) chose a very narrow, specialised form while Macneil (1981) 
and Wathne & Heide (2000) favour a much broader concept. The relative merits of these 
alternative definitions of the concept is of no relevance to the current discussion, but the 
choice of definition made for research purposes is of importance because the breadth of the 
definition has a significant effect on the magnitude of the perceived risk or threat that 
opportunism poses in practice. The major differences between Williamson’s (1985) and 
Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s (1981) definitions were the intent to deceive and 
hence the need for secrecy, and the number and nature of the principles being violated. In the 
comparison that follows the effects of those differences in practice is evaluated.  
 
Neither Williamson’s (1985) nor Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s (1981) definitions 
have any unambiguous implications for the possible costs generated by opportunism. They 
may be very high or very low in either case. However, when successfully deployed by a 
deceitful organisation, both the presence of opportunism-with-guile, and the source of its 
effects on the victim will be hard to detect, thus making it extremely difficult to manage and 
control. Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s (1981) definitions add openly opportunistic 
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behaviours to those involving guile, but since these additional behaviours will be readily 
detected by victims, they will tend to be easier to manage.  
 
Following criticisms of his opportunism assumption (see Donaldson, 1990 for example), 
Williamson repeatedly argued that his version of the phenomenon will be relatively 
uncommon in practice, see for example: (Williamson, 1998, p. 31; Williamson, 2005, p. 8; 
Williamson, 2008, p. 10, Williamson, 2009, pp. 150-151; Williamson, 2010, p. 678). His 
position is perhaps most clearly expressed here: [I do not believe]’… that most economic 
agents are engaged in opportunistic practices most of the time. Rather, most economic agents 
are engaged in business-as-usual, with little or no thought to opportunism, most of the time.  
Furthermore, Williamson repeatedly stressed that opportunism is only likely when the 
potential rewards for the perpetrator are very large or ‘the stakes are high’ - see for example 
(Williamson, 2008, p. 10; 2009, pp. 150-1; 2010, p. 678).  
 
That opportunism does not continuously intrude is partly because many economic agents are 
well-socialized.’ (Williamson, 1993, p. 98). Many people have been successfully persuaded 
by parents, schools and wider society that the behaviours of lying and cheating, upon which 
opportunism-with-guile relies, are undesirable. Moreover, those social norms are reinforced 
by a number of business norms connecting revealed deceit with damage to company 
reputation. The incidence of contract breach, for example, is low and companies rarely seek 
recourse to the law because: ‘Two norms are widely accepted. (1) Commitments are to be 
honored in almost all situations; one does not welsh on a deal, (2) One ought to produce a 
good product and stand behind it.’ (Macaulay, 1963, p. 63).  
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Failure to conform to these norms will damage a company’s reputation through the operation 
of ‘governance mechanisms’ such as the monitoring of the performance and behaviour of 
trading opposites. Companies who gain a reputation for being unreliable or deceitful may 
expect to lose customers or suppliers in the longer term. Klein discusses what he calls the 
‘self-enforcing range of contractual relationships’, which is generated by the threat of the 
termination of trading relationships and damage to reputation in the marketplace (Klein 1996, 
p. 449). Discussing the building industry, Cox & Thompson (1997) observe that: ‘… 
opportunism is curbed as the supplier is given the incentive of future work’. (p. 134) Fear of 
damage to company reputation tends to inhibit this form of bad behaviour.  
 
Hence opportunism-with-guile may be rare in practice. In contrast, by not only adding Overt 
opportunism to Williamson’s narrow definition but also increasing the range of principles to 
consider as targets for violation, Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s (1981) analysis 
would appear to open the door to a radical increase in the likely incidence of opportunism. 
Particularly since the high levels of disapproval that are associated with breach of contract 
and lying will not necessarily be generated by the violation of ‘restraints on unilateral use of 
power’, ‘general norms of equity’, ‘broad bargaining norms’ and the ‘shared expectation that 
parties will adapt to changing circumstances’ and so on.  
 
Williamson (1985; 1998) was not primarily interested in how buyers and suppliers interact 
with each other, his theory required behaviours that were so potentially threatening and 
destructive of trust in others that they would only be practiced in secret, and would compel 
individuals to stop trading with others and undertake the affected processes themselves, and 
thus explain the emergence of the firm from the market. In search of such an extreme 
phenomenon, his approach focuses on two principles whose violation is widely disapproved 
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of and which need the perpetrators to act with guile as the consequences and costs to them if 
uncovered may be so severe that commercial survival is threatened. Such behaviour will be 
difficult to manage, but the incidence will be low. Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s 
(1981) approaches have no such limitations and their definition allows for a much less 
dramatic phenomenon whose effects can be so relatively innocuous that the perpetrators may 
display the behaviour openly without fear of significant reputation damage.  
 
Hence in Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s (1981) treatment multiple principles may be 
involved, violation is regarded with differing levels of disapproval by business, guile may or 
may not be employed, the consequences and costs may be severe or slight, the behaviour may 
be difficult or relatively easy to manage, but the frequency should be markedly higher. There 
is no directly relevant data in the empirical literature on either the costs incurred by 
opportunistic behaviour in general or th  difficulty of managing the phenomenon. It is 
possible, however, to obtain some data on the frequency of the phenomenon.  
 
Unlike Williamson’s theory (1985), Wathne & Heide (2000) and Macneil’s (1981) analysis 
can be used to predict that the opportunism should be relatively commonplace in practice. 
Hawkins et al, (2013, p. 905) state that “Because there is a dearth of empirical research 
examining the opportunism-performance relationship and because some of the literature on 
opportunism suggests that “opportunism pays” in certain situations”, the paper turns now to 
that empirical evidence to assess the accuracy of that prediction. Having established that the 
notion of opportunism has moved from Williamson’s (1985) initial treatment, i.e. with guile, 
and further established that there is a lack of critical treatment of the concept, we now turn to 
how empirical work has captured data on the phenomenon in using the broader understanding 
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of opportunism. This has been perpetuated by the extensive use of Wathne & Heide’s (2000)  
work, which forms the basis of much empirical research on opportunism. 
 
3. Literature review methodology to identify empirical evidence of opportunism 
  
What follows is an assessment of the frequency with which opportunism occurs in buyer-
supplier exchange in order to more fully understand the use of guile in opportunism. This is a 
question of the empirical nature of a phenomenon that has been examined for more than a 
century: the behaviour of companies in supply chains (See for example Morris, 1910, p. 23) 
should not be seen as merely an arcane theoretical discussion about the microeconomic 
Theory of the Firm. After this length of time it should be possible to draw some conclusions 
about the extent and importance of the phenomenon. One meta-analysis observed that: 
‘…much of the empirical literature rests on the general presumption of opportunism, but few 
studies measure opportunism directly. Given its theoretical centrality, it is surprising that the 
empirical literature is largely devoid of efforts to measure opportunism.’ (Macher & 
Richman, 2008, p. 40).  
 
As shown in Section 2.2, a list of 1486 papers referring to the phenomenon were identified 
and in order to systematically review the literature on empirical evidence, we took the papers 
from the initial round of review (i.e. based on the search term “opportunism”) and rather than 
looking for critical treatments (i.e. as per section 2), we looked at whether there had been any 
data collection method used to detect whether opportunism exists in buyer-supplier 
relationships. Firstly, we looked to see if any literature established whether “direct” evidence 
of opportunism existed. We looked at the papers generated from the journals in Table 2 to 
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establish if there was any actual evidence and examples of opportunistic behaviour. The 
results and discussion of this are shown in section 3.1.  
 
3.1 Direct evidence  
 
The following section examines cases, that claim to describe the presence of opportunism, 
and attempts to match the phenomena described to the definitions above. The details from 
these cases are show in Appendix B and table 3 summarises the pertinent points.  This table 
sets out the context of the studies, provides an indication of the possible opportunistic 
behaviour and also shows an alternative view that may equally explain the behaviour: 
 
Citation Context Opportunistic 
Behaviour 
Alternative Explanation 
Cox & 
Thompson 
(1997 
Construction 
industry 
Adversarial 
relationships 
encourage 
opportunism: 
Increasing annual 
turnover through 
contractual claims 
Many reasons why construction 
companies present contractual 
claims such as dealing with poor 
management; inaccurate 
forecasts; inaccurate information. 
Anderson et 
al. (2000) 
US car firms and die 
manufacturers 
No evidence of buyer 
opportunism, but 
evidence of suppliers 
causing delays that 
could have been 
attributed to 
opportunism 
External suppliers do more work 
to perfect the dies than internal 
suppliers.  This takes longer, 
hence delays. 
Wathne and 
Heide (2000) 
Ford and supplier 
Lear Corp. 
Supplier failed to 
honour promises. 
Fords explanation of the 
supplier’s behaviour was that 
rather than displaying 
opportunism, Lear was suffering 
from poor management. 
Anderson 
and Jap 
(2005) 
Car firm and Parts 
supplier. 
Supplier reduces the 
number of coats of 
paint to cut costs of 
unit price. 
Evidence of Buyer using power 
over supplier.  Apparently 
opportunistic behaviour is a result 
of self-defence. 
Mitrega and 
Zolkiewski 
(2012) 
Internet 
infrastructure 
provider 
Offering better terms, 
quality and additional 
services to new 
customers at the same 
There is no market norm for 
suppliers to tell buyers the prices 
paid by all other customers.  
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price as the long term 
customer.   
Mitrega and 
Zolkiewski 
(2012) 
Coal supplier  Coal supplier not 
supplying coal at the 
contracted price 
Close reading of the contract 
showed that the supplier was 
operating within the terms of the 
contractual agreement.  There 
was no cheating or deliberate 
distortion of information. 
Cadden et al. 
(2015) 
Telecommunications The buying firm 
threatened to use a 
substitute from an 
alternative supplier 
Traditional mechanism  tactics in 
renegotiations 
 
Table 3 – Summary of direct evidence cases 
 
Since the overwhelming majority of published research does not attempt to describe company 
behaviour in detail, and the cases above are the result of wide ranging searches of the 
literature, it is suggested that they represent a large sample of the relevant population. In 
summary, in the five papers discussed, three cases of ‘opportunism’ were ambiguous [Cox & 
Thompson (1997); Anderson et al. (2000); Mitrega & Zolkiewski (2012)]. One was 
ambiguous and may well have been a defensive supplier reaction to bad buyer behaviour 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000), and one appeared to be competitive bargaining behaviour (Mitrega 
& Zolkiewski (2012). Two appear to be examples of Overt-opportunism [Klein et al. (1978); 
Mitrega & Zolkiewski (2012)]. There was only one clear example of opportunism-with-guile 
(Anderson & Jap (2005), but the authors themselves suggest that the relevant case the 
behaviour may have been defensive in origin rather than unprompted aggressive pursuit of 
self-interest through deceit.    
  
In conclusion, there is very little unambiguous, direct, empirical evidence that opportunism of 
any form constitutes a widespread, significant threat to company performance in buyer-
supplier exchanges. What little there is, however, is supplemented by a body of papers 
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reporting the results of statistical investigations into the concept which offer indirect evidence 
of the presence and prevalence of the phenomenon, and this paper now turns to an 
examination of these.    
 
3.2 Indirect empirical evidence  
 
We then looked for “indirect” evidence of opportunism, i.e. where one of the parties believes 
that opportunistic behaviour may be affecting the buyer-supplier relationship.  
By ignoring the normal focus on statistical evidence of associations between variables, and 
focusing instead on the data and the method of its collection, it is possible to extract an 
indirect measure of the incidence of opportunism from some empirical studies. For example, 
(Morgan et al. 2007) measured the phenomenon with a questionnaire asking respondents to 
consider a variety of statements relating to ‘opportunistic’ behaviours such as: ‘…considering 
this category of products, the supplier who has the most influence… [l]acks integrity when 
not closely monitored’ (Morgan et al. 2007, p. 519). Respondents were asked to rate the 
accuracy of the statement using a Likert scale with: ‘…“strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree” scale anchors.’ (p. 520). Thus: 
  
1  Strongly disagree 
2  Disagree 
3  Disagree somewhat 
4  Neither agree nor disagree 
5  Agree somewhat 
6  Agree 
7  Strongly agree 
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In their descriptive statistics, they show a mean for opportunism of 2.98 (ibid). Because the 
mean is well below the neutral mid-point value of 4 on their scale, this suggests that when 
asked the extent to which they agreed with the relevant questions many of the respondents 
(buyers) selected the ‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Disagree’ or ‘Disagree somewhat’ choices on the 
questionnaire. Whilst it is possible that in any individual survey a large number of responses 
of 4 or above might be over-whelmed by a smaller number of very low responses, there is no 
reason to suppose that this particular pattern would appear on a regular basis. Consequently, 
if a large number of surveys generate means at or below the mid-point of the scale this would 
suggest that many respondents did not perceive the relevant behaviours to be a significant 
feature of buyer-supplier exchange. Thus, empirical studies focused on buyer-supplier 
exchange, employing a construct for opportunism, citing descriptive statistics including a 
mean for that construct, and describing the scale used to collect the data, can be used to 
generate an indirect measure of the prevalence of opportunism.  
 
The details of the filtering process varied with the capabilities of the ‘within journal’ search 
option of the various publishers, but after removing those that did not contain the words 
“supplier”, “mean” or ”likert”, a total of 345 papers remained that matched the specification 
above. These were read in detail to remove all studies that failed to refer to buyer-supplier 
exchange - thus some strategic partnership and alliance studies were excluded because 
interactions of this kind take many different forms only a few of which involve buyers 
working with suppliers, e.g. Das & Teng, 2000, p. 13. Many alliance/partnership analyses do 
not focus on buyer-supplier exchanges, e.g.: Fan, 2011; Li, 2008; Luo, 2007; Johnson et al. 
1996; Parkhe, 1993. Furthermore, some do not make clear what type of exchange process 
they are studying, see e.g. Delerue-Vidot, 2006. Non-empirical papers were removed, along 
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with those missing either the scale used in the data collection process or descriptive statistics 
with a mean for opportunism e.g.: Deligonul et al. (2006); as well as excluding laboratory 
gaming and simulations to maintain the focus on opportunism in real buyer-supplier 
relationships.. The resulting list of 37 papers containing the necessary information on supplier 
and/or buyer opportunism is shown in Table 4 below: 
 
 
 
Source Context Respond
ents 
Opp. mean 
(Likert scale 
format) 
Mean 
at or 
below 
mid-
point 
of scale 
(freq.) 
Rank of 
opp. mean 
in study 
Opp. as 
dependent 
variable 
Self-
report 
or 
others 
   Supplier 
Opportunism 
    
Handley 
& 
Benton, 
2012 
 
Large US 
based 
companies 
with 
domestic  and 
/or offshore 
business 
processes. 
Suppliers 1.43, 1.40, 
1.33, 1.75, 
1.51, 1.50, 
1.29, 1.26, 
1.43 
(7 point) 
9 Lowest Y Self 
Lui & 
Ngo, 
2012 
 
Trading 
companies in 
garment and 
toy industries 
in Hong 
Kong and 
suppliers in 
China. 
Buyers 2.8 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Yang et 
al. 2011 
Manufacturin
g firms 
covering a 
wide range of 
industries, 
electronics, 
computer 
equipment, 
chemicals, 
apparel, 
Buyers 2.46, 3.62 
(7 point)  
2 Lowest N Others 
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furniture, 
food and 
textiles in 
China. 
Yen & 
Barnes, 
2011 
Anglo - 
Taiwanese 
buyer – seller  
firms. 
Buyers 3.07, 2.96, 
2.88, 2.93 
(7 point) 
4 Lowest Y Others 
Samaha 
et al. 
2011 
Fortune 500 
firm (seller) 
and its 
resellers 
(Channel 
members). 
Sectors 
included 
appliances, 
automotive, 
clothing, 
electronics, 
computers, 
sport etc. 
Buyers 2.23 
(5 point) 
1 Second 
lowest 
N Others 
Barthéle
my, 2011 
French 
franchise 
chains. 
Buyers 3.49 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Barnes et 
al. 2010 
Western 
exporters 
from US, 
Canada, GB, 
Ireland, 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
and 
importing 
firms based 
in Hong 
Kong. 
Buyers 2.96, 3.16, 
3.00, 3.28 
(7 point) 
4 Second 
lowest 
Y Others 
Ghosh & 
John, 
2009 
US 
engineering 
intensive 
industry 
sectors. 
Buyers 3.13 
(7 point) 
1 Second 
lowest 
N Others 
Lui et al. 
2009 
 
Hong Kong 
trading firms 
and Chinese 
suppliers. 
Buyers 2.9 
(5 point) 
1 Equal 
lowest 
N Others 
Lado et 
al. 2008 
US catalogue 
intermediarie
s affiliated 
with a large 
Buyers 2.24 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
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retail firm. 
Palmatie
r et al. 
2007 
Business to 
business 
relationships 
between a 
major 
Fortune 500 
company 
(seller) and 
its local 
distributor 
agents.  
Businesses 
cover 
products 
including 
clothing, 
hardware, 
furniture and 
appliances. 
Buyers 2.06, 2.13 
(5 point) 
1 2
nd
 lowest N Others 
Heide et 
al. 2007 
Business to 
Business 
relationships 
between 
manufacturer
s (suppliers) 
of building 
materials 
(doors, 
windows, 
frames, stairs, 
roofing 
products) and 
their 
downstream 
buyers. 
Suppliers 1.38, 1.56 
(7 point) 
2 Lowest N Self 
Morgan 
et al. 
2007 
UK 
supermarket 
retailers 
Buyers 2.98 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Carson 
et al. 
2006 
Outsourced 
R&D 
relationships 
in new 
product 
development 
in US 
Buyers NB 13.81/28 
(responses 
summed not 
averaged) 
1 Middle 
 
N Others 
Wuyts & 
Geysken
s, 2005 
Small to 
medium sized 
firms in 
Industrial and 
Buyers 1.99 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
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commercial 
machinery, 
computer 
equipment, 
electronic, 
electrical 
equipment 
and 
components 
in the 
Netherlands. 
Rokkan 
et al. 
2003 
Building 
material 
manufacturer
s and 
distributors. 
Buyers 1.44 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Skarmea
s et al. 
2002 
Importing 
distributors 
purchasing 
directly from 
overseas. 
Sectors: 
textiles, pulp 
and paper, 
chemicals, 
machinery 
and electrical 
machinery. 
Buyers 2.63 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Dorsch 
et al. 
1998 
Random 
sample of 
purchasing 
executives in 
the US 
Buyers 2.15, 2.32, 
3.05 
(6 point) 
3 Lowest- 2
nd
 
lowest 
 
N Self 
Lee, 
1998 
Australian 
exporters and 
foreign 
exchange 
partners. 
Suppliers 2.1 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
        
   Buyer 
 Opportunism 
    
Kashyap 
et al. 
2012 
US 
automotive 
manufacturer
s and their 
dealers. 
Buyers 
 
2.32 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
Noordho
ff et al. 
2011 
Dutch 
business to 
business 
innovation 
Suppliers 2.84 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
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relationships. 
Dev et 
al. 2011 
Large hotel 
firms in 
North 
America. 
Buyers 1.99 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
Ju et al. 
2011 
Export 
ventures in 
China 
Suppliers 2.42 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Liu et al. 
2010b 
 
Buyer- 
supplier 
relationships 
in the context 
of Chinese 
household 
appliances. 
Suppliers 3.25 
(7 point) 
1 Second 
Lowest 
Y Others 
Wong et 
al. 2005 
Manufacturer
s and 
suppliers 
various 
industries in 
Shanghai. 
Suppliers 2.62 
(5 point) 
1 Second 
Lowest 
Y Others 
Cavusgil 
et al. 
2004 
US based 
manufacturer
s and 
independent 
foreign 
distributers. 
Suppliers 3.887, 4.262, 
4.543, 4.585, 
5.072 
(7 point) 
1 Mixed Y Others 
Jap, 
2003 
Supply base 
of a major 
firm in the 
automotive 
industry 
involved in 
on-line 
reverse 
auctions. 
Suppliers 2.94 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Brown et 
al. 2000 
US Hotel 
Industry. 
Buyers 2.232 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
Dahlstro
m & 
Nygaard, 
1999 
Norwegian 
franchisee-
franchisor 
relationships 
in the oil 
industry. 
Buyers 3.06 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Provan 
& 
Skinner, 
1989 
Farm and 
Power 
equipment 
dealers and 
primary 
supplier 
Buyers 2.52 
(6 point) 
1 2nd lowest Y Self 
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organisations 
in US. 
        
   Both Buyer 
and Supplier 
Opportunism 
    
Caniëls 
& 
Gelderm
an, 2010 
Information 
and 
communicati
on 
Technology 
professionals  
in Dutch 
local 
government. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
Suppliers: 2.54 
Buyers: 2.03 
(5 point) 
2 Second 
Lowest 
Lowest 
Y Both 
Liu et al. 
2010a 
Distributors 
and 
Manufacturer
s in Chinese 
household 
appliances. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
4.31 
(7 point) 
0 Lowest N Self 
Liu et al. 
2009 
 
Household 
appliance 
manufacturer
s and 
distributors in 
China. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
4.09 
(7 point) 
0 Second 
Lowest 
Y 
 
Others 
Tokman 
et al. 
2007 
Greek SME, 
3PL 
providers. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
3.08 
(5 point) 
0 Second 
lowest 
N Others 
Kneyme
yer & 
Murphy, 
2005 
Users and 
Providers of 
3PL services 
in US. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
Suppliers: 4.0 
Buyers: 3.1 
1 Second and 
third lowest 
N Others 
Jap & 
Anderso
n, 2003 
Procurement 
division of 4 
large 
equipment 
manufacturer
s in 
computing, 
photography, 
chemicals 
and brewing. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
2.15 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Jap, 
2001 
Retailers and 
manufactures 
in chemical 
industry. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
2.2 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
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Table 4 - Empirical results: Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Exchange 
 
There are two clear outliers in table 4: Handley & Benton, 2012, who generated extremely 
low means for opportunism, and Cavusgil et al. 2004 with unusually high means. The former 
authors used atypical measures of shirking and poaching behaviours (see further comments 
below). The latter created an atypical sample by deliberately selecting industrial sectors 
where they thought it likely that opportunism would be an unusually serious problem, and 
asking their respondents to focus on only their ‘most challenging’ trading experiences. The 
‘unusual’ nature of both papers might justify their exclusion from what follows, however, 
since the results in the two papers in question, broadly speaking, cancel each other out, it was 
decided to leave them in. There are also a few papers with relatively high means in the 'both 
buyer and supplier' section, e.g.: Liu et al. 2009; 2010 and Tokman et al. 2007. The 
companies sampled in those papers include small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
Greek companies and some specifically featuring closely cooperative inter-company trading. 
This prompts speculation about whether opportunistic behaviour is perhaps related to size of 
firm, or is culture-specific, or is stimulated by especially close inter-company trading? 
However, with such a small number of papers, definitive statements are not possible at this 
time.  
 
3.3 Data interpretation  
 
The 37 empirical studies shown in Table 4 contain a total of 63 means for opportunism, of 
which 52 (82.5 %) were at or below the neutral mid-point of the relevant Likert scales used in 
the studies. Thus 82.5% of the papers appear to indicate that most respondents selected the 
‘Strongly disagree’, ‘Disagree’ or ‘Disagree somewhat’ choices on the relevant 
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questionnaires. Moreover, in more than a third (22) of the studies, the mean for opportunism 
was unambiguously the lowest recorded for all constructs measured using Likert scales. Thus, 
taken as a whole, the results in Table 4 above do not appear to support the claim that 
opportunism of any kind is widespread in buyer-supplier exchange. On the contrary, one 
might argue that this body of research appears to offer strong support for the view that, 
despite the conventional wisdom in the field, opportunistic behaviour is not commonplace 
between buyers and suppliers. This finding is reinforced by other scholars such as 
Moschandreas (1997) and Ketokvi and Mahoney (2016).  
 
4. Discussion 
 
4.1 Extended the range of behaviours deemed opportunistic 
 
The 37 papers detailed above contained in Table 4 make use of a total of 185 relevant 
questions. Many of these were only slightly modified versions of the same idea, e.g.: 
‘Sometimes this supplier alters the facts slightly in order to get what they need.’ (Lui & Ngo, 
2012, p. 93), and ‘[the supplier] Alters facts in order to meet their own goals and objectives.’ 
(Samaha et al. 2011, p. 113). Others were re-worded to fit a specific market, e.g.: ‘This 
supplier exaggerates needs to get what they desire.’ (Skarmeas et al. 2002, p. 781) compared 
with: ‘The contractor sometimes exaggerated the necessity of changes it wanted to the 
development plan or budget.’ (Carson et al. 2006, p. 1076). It is evident that there is 
extensive and quite understandable item duplication resulting from the sound research design 
practice of using questions from previous surveys whose validity is assumed to have been 
established. In order to reduce the entire group to a more manageable size, a list was created 
Page 28 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tppc E-mail: ppc@plymouth.ac.uk
Production Planning & Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
29 
 
and Table 5 shows the underlying, generic questions, the frequency with which each question 
was employed and the principles to whose breach the questions referred, thus: 
 
Question Question (principles being violated in bold) Frequency 
with which the 
question has 
been used  
 The [trading opposite]:  
 Honouring contracts/promises  
1 sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later. 19 
2 breaches formal or informal agreements to their benefit. 15 
3 does not always act in accordance with our contract(s).  6 
4 fails to deliver promises, as described in the contract, for its own 
interests. 
1 
 Truth Telling  
5 alters the facts in order to get what they need. 22 
6 lies about certain things in order to protect its interests. 19 
7 exaggerates needs to get what they desire 11 
8 does not provide a completely truthful picture when negotiating 9 
9 has presented facts in such a way that has made them look good. 6 
10 seems to believe that honesty does not pay when dealing with 
partners 
4 
11 makes false accusations 3 
12 is candid with us (reverse scored) 2 
 Maintaining equity/distributive justice  
13 will try to take advantage of “holes” in our contract to further their 
own interests. 
7 
14 feels it is OK to do anything within its means that will help further 
its own interests. 
7 
15 avoids fulfilling their responsibilities unless they are watched 6 
16 uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm. 5 
17 has benefited from our relationship to our detriment. 4 
18 withholds important information from us. 4 
19 fails to provide us with the support they are obliged to 4 
20 is unwilling to accept responsibility 3 
21 expects my firm to pay for more than their fair share of the costs to 
correct a problem 
2 
22 usually register a complaint if our company fails to meet our 
cooperative agreements 
1 
23 expects to receive an unreasonably large share of the benefits from 
our cooperative agreements  
1 
24 tries to renegotiate contracts to its own advantage 1 
25 tends to escalate cost estimates as projects progress 1  
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26 is less and less cooperative as projects progress 1 
27 is reluctant to accept changes without receiving concessions and 
compromises 
1 
28 abuses displays of honesty on our part 1 
29 has coerced us unfairly in order to gain accessions 1 
30 is aloof toward us 1 
31 fails to provide proper notification 1 
 Observing bargaining norms  
32 does not negotiate from a good faith bargaining perspective 6 
 Avoiding shirking  
 If [the customer] were not able to detect it, how likely are members 
of our organization to… 
 
33 not assign your best people to your business or account with [the 
customer] ? 
1 
34 provide a lower than agreed to level of resources? 1 
35 withhold information that may be beneficial to [the customer]? 1 
36 not share the benefits of process improvements? 1 
37 delay making agreed to investments in employee training? 1 
38 delay making agreed to investments in new technology? 1 
 Avoiding poaching  
 If [the customer] were not able to detect it, how likely are members 
of our organization to… 
 
39 use potentially proprietary information obtained through your 
relationship with [the customer] to gain favor with other clients? 
1 
40 use potentially proprietary information obtained through your 
relationship with [the customer] to help win business with other 
customers? 
1 
41 use potentially proprietary information obtained through your 
relationship with [the customer] to develop new services that you 
can offer in the marketplace? 
1 
 Avoiding deceit  
42 has tried to deceive us on several occasions 1  
 
Table 5 – Generic questions in empirical surveys 
 
Many of the behaviours described by that set of questions could only hope to have positive 
outcomes for the perpetrators if they possessed a power surplus over their trading partners 
and were prepared to use it to further their own interests, thus violating the principle of 
restraining from the ’unilateral use of power’. Question 27 addresses the ’shared expectation 
that parties will adapt to changing circumstances and question 32 refers directly to bargaining 
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behaviour, albeit in a somewhat puzzling manner that is discussed below. Overall, one may 
conclude that the 37 empirical studies have incorporated, to varying degrees, all of the 
additional principles described by Wathne & Heide (2000), and this is unlikely therefore to 
be a limiting factor on the recorded incidence of opportunism. The process of continually 
basing new research on existing survey constructs therefore serves to extend the perception of 
behaviours that can be considered opportunistic. As scholars use the term to apply to a wider 
range of behaviours, future research should focus on a return to Williamson’s core definition.  
 
 
4.2 Distinguishing between motivations – re-establishing the key role of guile 
 
The critical factor defining the presence of all forms of opportunism is the motivation of the 
party breaking the promise. In studies where they are asked to describe the behaviour of their 
trading opposites (see final column in Table 4), the motivations underlying that behaviour are 
frequently unknown to the respondents. An examination of the questions reveals that they 
have differing abilities to capture data relating to, and subsequently distinguish between, not 
only Overt-opportunism and opportunism-with-guile, but also opportunistic and non-
opportunistic behaviours in general. Consequently, versions of the questions above will, not 
only pick up incidences of opportunism with and without guile, but also other, non-
opportunistic behaviours.  
 
This lack of concern for the presence or absence of guile is shown in question 1: ‘This 
supplier has sometimes promised to do things without actually doing them later.’(Ghosh & 
John, 2009, p.603). This question appears in 19 papers with only minor variations in wording. 
Whilst the question appears superficially to match Williamson’s (1985) definition, there are 
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many reasons why companies fail to honour promises. Companies may do so as a result of 
both opportunism-with-guile or Overt-opportunism. However, such behaviour might equally 
be caused by unforeseeable events such as accidents, management incompetence, human 
error, working on the basis of inaccurate information such as forecasts, ambiguity in framing 
leading to differing interpretations of contracts and instructions and even offering well-
intentioned but erroneous statements and so on. Similarly, all of the truth telling violation 
questions (5-12), with the exception perhaps of number 11, are capable of generating scores 
above the neutral mid-point on the scale in response to the various non-opportunistic reasons 
such as incompetence, accidents and the like. Reduced question validity of this kind will act 
to inflate the apparent incidence of opportunism.  
 
To successfully capture the incidence of opportunism-with-guile, questionnaire items must 
exclude behaviours conducted openly. Failure to do so will exaggerate recorded frequencies. 
For example: ‘this buyer will take advantage of ‘holes’ in our contracts to further their own 
interests’ (Liu et al, 2010b, p. 849), or: ‘The distributor has interpreted terms of the contract 
in [its] favour at our expense.’ (Cavusgil et al. 2004, p. 17). If the distributor or buyer exhibits 
these behaviours openly without making any attempt to hide or disguise their actions, then 
this might be the result of Overt-opportunism or perhaps management incompetence and so 
on. Excluding the questions relating to the act of lying (which are dealt with below), only a 
few items in the studies were specifically intended to detect opportunism-with-guile by 
stressing the use of secrecy by the perpetrators. Thus (Morgan et al. 2007) include question 
42 in Table 5: ’…considering this category of products, the supplier who has the most 
influence has tried to deceive us on several occasions…’ (p. 519). Six surveys including 
(Morgan et al. 2007) use variations on question 15: ‘avoids fulfilling their responsibilities 
unless they are watched’. In each case these questions were mixed in with others less closely 
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targeted on guile, thus making it impossible to single out the incidence of opportunism-with-
guile from those studies. Handley & Benton (2010), in contrast, sought to capture the 
respondents’ intent to deceive throughout their entire survey by preceding all questions with 
the phrase ‘If [the customer] were not able to detect it, how likely are members of our 
organization to…’(questions 33-41). Their findings include the lowest means for 
opportunism in all of the studies in this analysis, and thus may support Williamson’s claim 
that opportunism-with-guile will be unusual in practice. It should be noted however that 
another explanation for the very low incidence reported by Handley & Benton is that 
respondents asked to self-report opportunistic behaviour are likely to under-report as a result 
of the effects of social acceptability bias. Few practitioners will be keen to tell researchers 
that they have behaved in a reprehensible manner. Thus, it would be reasonable to suppose 
that the real incidence of opportunism-with-guile in somewhat higher than that captured in 
Handley & Benton (2010). The apparent incidence will also be boosted by above neutral 
responses to some of the questions that make no attempt to stress secrecy.  
 
In addition to the distortions generated by social acceptability bias there is another severe 
epistemological difficulty in designing questionnaire items capable of detecting opportunism-
with-guile. For example, one commonly employed question takes the form: ‘This supplier 
breaches formal or informal agreements to their benefit’. If the supplier commits the breach 
openly then the behaviour may be Overt-opportunism. However, if the perpetrators use guile 
to hide their actions in order to avoid the disapproval that would follow their discovery, the 
victims will be unaware that any breach has occurred, unless the attempt is uncovered and 
thus fails in its objective. Thus, all such questions will, by definition, be unable to detect 
successful acts of opportunism-with-guile, and only capable of picking up both Overt-
opportunism and failed attempts at opportunism-with-guile. However, there will be no way of 
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distinguishing between the overt and with-guile forms of behaviour in the published data. 
Where questions of this form are employed the true incidence of opportunism-with-guile may 
be higher than the results suggest, but unlike the incidence depressing effects of social 
acceptability bias, because the behaviour is detected, the combined incidence of opportunism 
with and without guile will not be artificially reduced.   
 
Excluding the 16 questions specifically designed to detect secrecy and deceit and the 6 
questions targeting negotiating practice (see below), all of the remaining questionnaire items 
are capable of generating positive, above neutral responses to, variously, failed opportunism-
with-guile, Overt-opportunism, some routine negotiating practices and a variety of other non-
opportunistic behaviours. Authors may have decided that it is either not necessary to search 
for evidence of guile, or perhaps too difficult to achieve that objective. Given the very high 
citation level of Wathne & Heide’s (2000) paper with its confusing handling of the concept of 
guile and emphasis on Overt-opportunism [53% of the empirical papers discussed below that 
were published after 2000 cite Wathne & Heide (2000) directly - see ‘Comments’ column in 
Appendix A: Definitions of opportunism in the empirical literature], belief that it is not 
necessary to search for guile is entirely understandable.  
 
In Williamson’s (1985) theory, the guile was needed to hide the reprehensible behaviour and 
would only be used when the potential benefits to the perpetrators were high enough to 
warrant the risk of reputation damage. Hence the incidence should be low. By ignoring guile 
the incidence should be increased as an extensive range of trivial, low cost/benefit behaviours 
will match the alternative, guile-free treatment of the phenomenon. It is, for example, not 
normal practice to attack your own organisation’s image when talking to trading opposites. 
So buyers or suppliers might quite openly and casually present: ‘facts in such a way that has 
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made them look good.’ (question 9) in minor events that have no significant monetary 
implications. Similarly, a supplier who explains a late delivery by reference to a vehicle 
breakdown might be perceived as using: ‘unexpected events to extract concessions from our 
firm’ (question 16), and so on. It is reasonable to suppose therefore that many of the 
remaining 162 questions will be likely to generate more above neutral responses, than 
questions designed to detect only high-costs behaviours carried out in secret.  
 
4.3 Accepted principles - negotiation practice 
 
As was discussed earlier, Williamson’s theory focuses mainly on the principles of truth-
telling and the honouring of contracts. One of Wathne & Heide’s (2000) contributions 
drawing on Macneil (1981), was to expand the number of principles that could be violated by 
opportunistic behaviour to include ‘the expectation of sharing benefits and burdens’, ‘general 
norms of equity’, ‘distributive justice’, ‘restraints on unilateral use of power’, the ‘shared 
expectation that parties will adapt to changing circumstances’ and ‘broad bargaining norms’. 
(Wathne & Heide’s, 2000, p. 40).  The first three of those principles are variations on the 
principle of behaving in a fair manner towards your trading opposites. These are 
comprehensively covered by questions 13-31 in Table 5 all of which relate to the principle of 
‘Maintaining equity/distributive justice’.  
 
Wathne & Heide (2000) refer to the principle of ‘broad bargaining norms’ and question 32: 
‘does not negotiate from a good faith bargaining perspective’ clearly refers to this activity. It 
is possible, however that, the question might be misinterpreted by respondents unfamiliar 
with the detailed, American legal origins of the phrase. Particularly since there is one 
common form of negotiating that bears a superficial resemblance to opportunism. There are 
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two main bargaining strategies employed in Buyer-supplier exchange - Distributive and 
Integrative (Lewicki et al. 2006). The former is competitive whereas the latter is entirely 
cooperative in nature and used, for example, in strategic partnerships. The majority of buyer-
supplier negotiations use a combination of tactics from both strategies. Distributive 
negotiation routinely involves the use of a number of tactics that may resemble opportunism-
with-guile, including the deliberate distortion or withholding of information, lying, 
exaggerating, bluffing and the like.  
 
These behaviours are regarded as perfectly acceptable within the context of the distributive 
negotiating process, but once negotiations are concluded and an agreement reached, the same 
behaviours revert to their ‘unacceptable’ status. In addition to question 32, 103 of the 
questions could return an above neutral response if the respondent was considering the 
behaviour of their trading partners during distributive negotiations. For example it is not 
uncommon for negotiators to either exaggerate a position (question 7) or refer to unexpected 
events to extract concessions (question 16) during a distributive negotiation. By accidentally 
recording non-opportunistic distributive negotiating behaviours as a form of opportunism, 
this reduced question validity is likely to create a false increase in the recorded incidence of 
the phenomenon.  
 
4.4 Summary of discussion 
 
There is likely to be some under-reporting of opportunism-with-guile, but Williamson (1985)  
has argued that this behaviour will be relatively unusual. Moreover, one may argue that this 
under-reporting will be more than compensated for by the over-reporting of apparent 
opportunism that will occur as many of the questions employed record above neutral 
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responses to behaviours that have no opportunistic intent. The construct validity of many of 
the questions is open to question. However, the net effect of their reduced construct validity 
should be an over, rather than an under-reporting of the incidence of opportunism. Hence the 
conclusion that the very low incidence of opportunistic behaviours recorded is not the result 
of poorly designed questionnaire items. Indeed, the recorded incidence, despite being very 
low, may well be exaggerated. The published direct and indirect empirical evidence thus 
suggests that, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the relevant literatures, opportunistic 
behaviours of all kinds may indeed be relatively uncommon in buyer-supplier exchange (see 
also Moschandreas, 1979).  
 
However, before one can conclude that management may safely ignore the concept, one 
objection remains. Although the incidence may be low, the effects of the phenomenon may 
be so severe that they cannot safely be ignored (Crosno and Dahlstron, 2008). In the 
Purchasing context, it would only take one major opportunistic act by a supplier of a critical 
product or service, performed at the wrong point in time, to cause a serious failure for a 
buyer’s organisation. From a management perspective, what matters is the balance of the 
magnitude of the threat with the likelihood of its occurrence and not all instances of 
opportunism will have severe consequences. This follows the portfolio approach advocated 
initially by Kraljic (1983) in which categories of spend are differentiated according to their 
risk impact on operational disruption and also on bottom line profitability. This segmentation 
allows buying organizations to adopt different strategies to best deal with specific type of 
purchases. Companies aim to move their supply relationships to those of a less impactful 
nature (Gelderman and Van Weele, 2002) and have significantly reduced the number of 
major suppliers in recent years (Wagner & Johnson, 2004), to try and establish closer 
relationships with fewer selected suppliers (e.g., Goffin et al., 1997). If a supplier should 
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display such opportunistic behaviour, this will only be of significance if they also happen to 
supply a product or service that is both of strategic importance to the buyer, and difficult to 
re-source. However, the majority of any company’s purchases are of not of strategic 
significance (e.g. 20% of overall purchases as shown in Gangurde & Chavan, 2016), and only 
a minority is difficult to re-source. Performance failures by most suppliers can be worked 
around with relatively little difficulty. Competent purchasing functions will already be paying 
close management attention to strategically important suppliers/purchases, regardless of the 
possible risk from opportunism. Once more, this reduces the likelihood and frequency of 
large-impact threats from this phenomenon. Similarly, if the overwhelming view of 
practitioners was that suppli r relationships are inherent opportunistic, we would expect to 
see a decrease in the quantity and/or range of outsourcing activities, but the evidence is to the 
contrary (Financial Times). 
 
The broader treatment of Wathne & Heide (2000) not only makes opportunism much more 
common than the Williamson variant, but also much less commercially threatening. By 
rejecting Williamson’s need for guile and increasing the range of principles that may be 
considered for potential violation, Wathne & Heide (2000) and all the authors who follow 
this approach also remove the likelihood that the costs/benefits arising from the act of 
opportunism will be substantial. Indeed, taken to their logical limit, a principle such as their: 
‘shared expectation that parties will adapt to changing circumstances’  
 
The definitions of opportunism as applied to Buyer-supplier exchange have been clarified to 
sharpen the effects of the presence or absence of guile on the frequency, difficulty of 
managing and potential associated costs generated by the phenomenon. Direct evidence of 
the presence of opportunism has been shown to be extremely limited and ambiguous in 
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nature, and the indirect empirical evidence appears to contradict the claim that the 
opportunism is widespread in the process of buyer-supplier exchange.  
 
5. Implications 
5.1 Research and methodological implications 
 
Clearly it would be unreasonable to criticise the empirical papers discussed above for a 
failure to test the underlying assumptions of the TCE model; their purpose is to search for 
statistical relationships between constructs and in some ways this reflects the perception that 
much of this research does not have opportunism as it’s central focus (Hawkins et al. 2013) . 
Nevertheless, where research employs Likert scales in questionnaires that subsequently 
generate a mean for the dependent variable that is below the mid-way point on the scale (see 
the second last column in Table 4, one might suggest that alarm bells should begin to sound. 
This finding suggests that any positive correlations uncovered between the opportunism scale 
and independent variables indicate that increases in the various independent variables are 
associated with increases in the numerical value of the scale. However, if these variations are 
not sufficient to change the mean value of the scale to a value above the mid-point, then the 
variations only reduce the extent to which the respondents did not find their trading partners’ 
behaviour to be opportunistic in nature. Thus, in such studies, findings of this kind suggest 
that the importance, if not the very existence of the core phenomenon being studied is under 
some doubt.  
 
Moreover, the definition of opportunism offered by Macneil (1981) and Wathne & Heide 
(2000) has so little in common with the deliberately narrow, specialised version devised by 
Williamson (1985) that work on buyer-supplier relationships should ensure that it is clear 
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which “type” of opportunism is being used.  Our research suggests that there is lack of 
critique relating “opportunism with guile” as Williamson meant.   The word “guile” has been 
lost and the way surveys are designed perpetuates this view.      
 
It is recommended therefore that there is an urgent need to answer, instead the following 
questions: 
• How common-place are the different forms of opportunism?  
• How do the risks and threats posed by the different forms to victims and perpetrators 
compare?   
This will require significant improvements in the construct validity of measures of 
opportunism and solutions to the epistemological difficulties discussed above that confound 
the task of measuring the incidence of the phenomenon.  This research highlights the 
weaknesses of previous methodologies, particularly due to the social desirability effect (as 
per Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008) when trying to uncover “opportunism with guile” in buyer-
supplier exchanges and also the difficulty in obtaining direct empirical evidence when there 
are potential disparities between reasons and actions/behaviour. Given that most of the 
previous research on the topic have been based on surveys it seems appropriate to consider 
qualitative methods such as observation or critical incident techniques to explore these 
relationships more closely, over a period of time and to gain a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
 
5.2 Management implications 
 
From a management perspective, there is a risk that an uncritical acceptance of the supposed 
prevalence of opportunism will encourage organisations to adopt a variety of policies and 
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behaviours inimical to their long-term financial wellbeing. If buyers assume that suppliers are 
essentially untrustworthy in nature, they might, for example, develop an unnecessarily 
adversarial trading attitude that would prevent the potential benefits that flow from more 
cooperative inter-company trading. They might also be reluctant to make long-term 
commitments that would enhance the process of exchange with suppliers. Similarly, suppliers 
wary of opportunistic buyers might hesitate before sharing information capable of improving 
the buyer’s effectiveness. Suspicious buyers may devote excessive time and effort to the 
construction of unnecessarily complex contractual arrangements, or perhaps the waste of 
resources on expensive policies intended to police supplier quality control procedures, and so 
on. However, the results of the analysis above suggest that in the interests of attaining 
maximum system efficiency, management should avoid devoting large amounts of resources 
to the control of opportunism. 
 
6. Conclusions and contributions 
 
It is now possible to offer answers to the questions the paper set out to tackle: 
 
o Is opportunistic behaviour common in buyer-supplier exchange? 
o Are different forms of opportunism of equal importance to practitioners?  
o Is opportunism a serious problem that demands significant management 
attention?  
 
We make no comment on the issue with regard to staff relations within organisations (e.g. 
Head & Lucas, 2004) or between organisations in other forms of inter-company relations 
such as strategic alliances (e.g. Das, 2004). Nevertheless, TCE theory predicts that high levels 
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of opportunism-with-guile will be unusual in markets (Williamson, 1985), and the direct and 
indirect evidence discussed above indicates that opportunism, both with guile and without, is 
a relatively rare phenomenon in buyer-supplier exchange. It is not suggested that 
opportunism poses no risk, but although Overt-opportunism displayed by very powerful 
buyers may be relatively common in some markets, managements are familiar with these 
challenges and need little help from academia in identifying or coping with them. Logic 
suggests that forms of opportunism that pose a high risk to the would-be perpetrators will 
occur very infrequently, whereas those with a low risk such as Overt-opportunism with 
limited commercial implications will be more common-place.  
 
Overall, we suggest that there is a possibility that opportunism will occasionally generate 
serious problems for a very small number of companies. However, the frequency of the 
occurrence of severe problems will be so low that it does not warrant the allocation of 
significant management resources beyond those routinely allocated to strategically critical 
customers or suppliers. Therefore, these can be seen as being serious events whose 
occurrence is so unusual that they are not regarded as being worthy of management attention.  
 
Finally, a persuasive piece of evidence that the risk is very small lies in the absence of 
records of cases of opportunistic behaviour causing catastrophic survival problems for 
companies. It is reasonable to suppose that such events would have made some impression 
and been cited, yet they appear to be absent from the relevant literatures. We would suggest 
that opportunism falls into the category of phenomena that are real and with potentially 
serious consequences, but also sufficiently rare as to require little dedicated management 
attention.  
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The available empirical evidence on many aspects of the phenomenon is very limited and this 
prompts some recommendations for future research. The current research on opportunism is 
towards further exploration of methods of controlling or minimising occurrences of 
opportunism.  However, our contribution calls for the relevance of “guile” to be re-
established and our detailed review of the empirical evidence shows that it may be an 
unusual, relatively low-risk phenomenon and suggests this current approach is not well 
founded. From this perspective there has been a move away from the original Williamson 
definition to cover behaviours, which we class as overt opportunism, which can be uncovered 
and controlled by behavioural means, openness and trust in the buyer-supplier exchange 
relationships. Even with overt opportunism, our research indicates that this is still not 
significant. Our contribution calls for the relevance of “guile” to be re-established and to go 
back to the source of the concept rather than creating an academic consensus through circular 
use of ill- defined surveys.   
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Appendix A - Definitions of opportunism in the empirical literature 
 
Literature Source Definition of Opportunism Comments  
Handley and 
Benton, 2012 
'Opportunism is defined as 
“self-interest seeking with 
guile” (Williamson, 1975, p. 
6). The behavioral assumption 
of opportunism in TCT 
presupposes that if given the 
opportunity, individuals will 
naturally act in a deceitful, 
self-serving manner.' p. 56 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is used. 
Guile and/or deceit present. Wathne & 
Heide (2000) cited. 
Lui & Ngo, 2012 'Transaction cost economics 
assumes the exchange partners 
to be opportunistic, and will 
seek self-interest at the expense 
of the common interests of a 
relationship (Williamson, 
1985).' p. 81 
Williamson’s 1985 reference, but guile 
omitted. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
cited. 
Kashyap et al. 2012 Does not define Wathne & Heide (2000) cited 
Yang et al. 2011 ‘…opportunism, or “self-
interest seeking with guile,” 
which includes such behaviors 
as lying and cheating, as well 
as more subtle forms of deceit, 
like violating agreements 
(Williamson, 1985: p.47).’ p. 
90 
Williamson’s 1985 definition is used. 
Guile and/or deceit present. Wathne & 
Heide (2000) not cited. 
Noordhoff et al. 
2011 
Does not define Wathne & Heide (2000) cited. 
Ju et al. 2011 ‘…franchisees may be tempted 
to engage in opportunistic 
behavior by “wilfully 
disregarding the franchisor's 
goals in pursuit of their own 
entrepreneurial interests” …’  
p. 95 
Guile omitted. Wathne & Heide 
(2000) cited. 
Yen & Barnes, 2011 
 
‘From a buyer's perspective, 
opportunistic behavior occurs 
when the seller takes 
unexpected action for its own 
gain but generates negative 
outcomes for the relationship 
partner…’ p. 349  
Guile omitted. Wathne & Heide 
(2000) not cited. 
Samaha et al. 2011 ‘We use the term “seller 
opportunism” to capture the 
channel member’s perception 
of the degree to which the 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is used. 
Guile and/or deceit present. Wathne & 
Heide (2000) not cited. 
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seller engages in self-interest-
seeking behaviors with guile.’ 
p. 102 
Barthélemy, 2011 ‘…franchisees may be tempted 
to engage in opportunistic 
behavior by “wilfully 
disregarding the franchisor's 
goals in pursuit of their own 
entrepreneurial interests” …’ p. 
95 
Guile omitted. Wathne & Heide 
(2000) not cited. 
Dev et al. 2011 ‘…possibility arises that one 
partner or the other will 
work deceptively to its own 
advantage.’ p. 377  
Deceit present. Wathne & Heide 
(2000) cited. 
Caniëls & 
Gelderman, 2010 
'...‘self interest seeking with 
guile’ (Williamson, 1975, p. 6). 
Opportunism includes all kinds 
of deceitful behaviour .' p. 239 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is used. 
Guile and/or deceit present. Wathne & 
Heide (2000) not cited. 
Barnes et al. 2010 
 
‘In brief, opportunism reflects 
a form of behavior in which 
some element of deceit is 
apparent…’ p. 35 
Deceit present. Wathne & Heide 
(2000) cited. 
Liu et al. (2010)a Williamson’s 1985 definition is 
used. 
Williamson’s 1985 definition is used. 
Guile and/or deceit present. Wathne & 
Heide (2000) not cited. 
Liu et al. (2010)b ‘Opportunism, defined as the 
extent to which a channel 
member perceives his partner 
to engage in “self-seeking 
behaviors with guile” 
(Williamson, 1975)... ‘ p.846 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
not cited. 
Ghosh & John, 2009 ‘…by self-interested strategic 
behavior and guile on the part 
of the supplier during contract 
execution.’ p. 602 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
not cited. 
Liu et al. 2009 ‘Opportunism is defined by 
Williamson as self-interest 
seeking with guile (1985).’, p. 
294 
Williamson's 1985 definition is used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
cited. 
Lui et al. 2009 
 
'...self-interest seeking with 
guile.’  p.1215 
 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
not cited. 
Lado et al. 2008 ‘…opportunism refers to 
‘calculated efforts [by an 
exchange agent] to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse’ 
(Williamson, 1985: 47) an 
exchange party.’  p. 403 
Williamson's 1985 definition is used. 
Guile present. 
Wathne & Heide (2000) not cited. 
Palmatier et al. 2007 Does not define Wathne & Heide (2000) cited. 
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Heide et al. 2007 ‘Supplier opportunism. The 
scale describes the extent to 
which the supplier engages in 
"self-interest seeking with 
guile" (see Williamson's [1975, 
p. 6]’  p. 429 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
not cited. 
Tokman et al. 2007 Does not define Wathne & Heide (2000) not cited. 
Morgan et al. 2007 ‘…is more likely to engage in 
guileful self-interest seeking, 
i.e., opportunistic behavior …’, 
p. 515 
Williamson definition with guile. 
Wathne & Heide (2000) cited. 
Carson et al. 2006 ‘Williamson (1985) defined 
opportunism as self-interest 
eking of a strategic (i.e., 
secretive, deceptive, or 
guileful) nature undertaken to 
redirect profits from vulnerable 
partners.’, p. 1059 
Williamson’s 1985 definition is used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
not cited. 
Wuyts & Geyskens, 
2005 
‘Opportunism is defined as 
self-interest seeking with 
guile…’  p.106 
Williamson definition. Guile present. 
Wathne & Heide (2000) not cited. 
Wong et al. 2005  ‘The possibility of 
opportunistic behavior is an 
important barrier to 
collaboration because it raises 
fears of exploitation as partners 
pursue their self-interests with 
guile (Williamson, 1985, 
1991).’ p782 
Williamson’s 1985 definition is used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
cited. 
Kneymeyer & 
Murphy, 2005 
‘…deceit-oriented violation of 
implicit or explicit promises 
about one’s appropriate or 
required role behavior.’ p. 712 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
not cited. 
Cavusgil et al. 2004 ‘… it is possible to have a 
relationship that is 
characterized as cooperative in 
an aggregate sense but that 
over time may offer 
opportunities for self-interest 
seeking at the other party's 
expense…’ p. 211 
Guile omitted. Wathne & Heide 
(2000) cited. 
Jap, 2003 ‘…defined as self-interest-
seeking with guile.’, p. 98 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
cited. 
Jap & Anderson, 
2003 
‘Opportunism is self-interest 
seeking with guile’, p. 1686 
Guile present.  Wathne & Heide 
(2000) cited. 
Rokkan et al. 2003 Not defined. ` Wathne & Heide (2000) cited. 
Skarmeas et al. 2002 Williamson’s 1985 definition is 
used. 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
cited. 
Jap, 2001 ‘self-interest seeking with 
guile,’, p. 24 
Guile present. Wathne & Heide (2000) 
cited. 
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Brown et al. 2000 Williamson’s 1975 definition is 
used. 
Guile present.  
Dahlstrom & 
Nygaard, 1999 
Williamson’s 1985 definition is 
used. 
‘…calculated efforts to mislead 
and confuse trading partners .’  
p. 161 
Guile present.  
Dorsch et al. 1998 Williamson’s 1975 definition is 
used. 
Guile present. 
Lee, 1998 Williamson’s 1975 definition is 
used. 
Guile present. 
Provan & Skinner, 
1989 
Williamson’s 1975 definition is 
used. 
Guile present. 
 
 
 
 
  
Page 56 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tppc E-mail: ppc@plymouth.ac.uk
Production Planning & Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
57 
 
Appendix B – Direct evidence cases (further details) 
 
Cox & Thompson (1997) suggest that the 'peculiar' nature of the UK construction industry 
has created: '...adversarial arms-length relations with the parties selecting opportunistic 
behaviour rather than working together.' (p. 129). They claim 'considerable' evidence thus: 
'...a recent survey of the top 50 UK contractors revealed that a quarter earned between 10% 
and 15% of their annual turnovers through contractual claims with clients or suppliers, and a 
further third earned between 5% and 10% of their turnovers in a similar way...' ibid. There 
are a large number of reasons why construction companies resort to contractual claims such 
as responding to incompetent management practices, dealing with inaccurate 
forecasts/information and so on. Opportunism of any kind is only one of them. In the absence 
of evidence that opportunism is the main cause, the incidence of opportunism in this market 
remains indeterminate. Anderson et al. (2000) studied relations between US car firms and die 
manufacturers. They found no evidence of buyer opportunism, but did find evidence of 
suppliers causing delivery delays that may have been attributable to opportunism. However, 
these effects were explained by the supplier as the result of: ‘... anticipating that their parts 
are likely to be blamed for problems, external suppliers do more work to perfect the dies 
(relative to part-level specifications) than internal suppliers resulting in “better'' parts (lower 
rework) but taking longer to achieve (longer submission delays). (Anderson et al. 2000, 745). 
Since it impossible to judge the veracity of the supplier’s claims, it is not possible to arrive at 
an unequivocal identification of the form of company behaviour described.  
 
In the same year, Wathne & Heide (2000) described two relevant cases. One features Ford 
and a supplier (Lear Corp.), who failed to honour promises. However, the gap between the 
supplier’s promises and actions was so wide that the chances of guile remaining undetected 
Page 57 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tppc E-mail: ppc@plymouth.ac.uk
Production Planning & Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
58 
 
were minimal. If it had been uncovered, it would have damaged Lear’s relations with Ford. 
Consequently, it is most unlikely that that they set out to deliberately deceive Ford - for 
details see Walton, (1997). This may therefore have been a case of Overt-opportunism. 
However, a Ford cost analyst commenting on one aspect of Lear‘s behaviour is quoted 
saying: "They're not venal, just incompetent" (Walton, 1997, 154). It is possible that, rather 
than displaying opportunism, Lear may simply have suffered from poor management. Once 
more a definitive identification of opportunism is impossible. Moreover, even if we 
tentatively conclude that it was an example of Overt-opportunism, the description of Ford’s 
behaviour at the time includes the following phrases: ‘Ford seemed wedded to old smash-
mouth tactics’; the program manager was a ‘…tough-minded Ford veteran with an especially 
combative attitude toward suppliers’ and so on (Walton, 1997). Given the combination of 
Ford’s power and aggressive attitude, it is possible that some of Lear’s behaviour may have 
been defensive reaction to earlier attacks from Ford. Companies who act ‘opportunistically’ 
in response to previous bad behaviour on the part of trading partners may well be breaching 
the principles of telling the truth or honouring contracts, however they are not simply ‘taking 
advantage’ of their trading opposites. They may be acting to avoid the breach of a different, 
conflicting principle such as Wathne & Heide’s ‘general norms of equity’, ‘restraints on 
unilateral use of power’, the need to avoid ‘exploiting vulnerability’ and so on. An 
unambiguous identification of transgressive, opportunistic behaviour on the part of one 
trading partner is impossible when multiple conflicting principles are present and under 
attack. In such cases, it is necessary to examine the behaviour of all the parties involved, and 
the sequence of events. Only the first ‘bad’ behaviour in circumstances such as those just 
described would be opportunistic in the sense of one party ‘taking advantage’ of the other, 
but details of precisely who did what and when are rarely available in such cases. It is 
possible, therefore, that Lear’s behaviour in the above case was not something arising in the 
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market beyond the buyer’s control that required management attention. Ford may have 
caused the behaviour to arise in the first place, and if so, the ‘problem’ might have been 
avoided if the buyer had behaved more reasonably.  
 
In Anderson & Jap (2005), a supplier dealing with a car company is quoted stating: ‘If one 
decides to eliminate the first three coats of paint put on the component, well, then one cuts 
costs on the price of the unit, and that profit will be shared with Purchasing, which will 
recuperate a piece of the pie. Now, if one doesn’t say anything, all the savings are ours… 
[emphasis in the original]’ (Anderson & Jap, 2005, 77). This does indeed appear to be an 
unambiguous example of opportunism-with-guile. However, earlier in the same paper the 
authors observe that the car company buyer used its power over the supplier in an over-
bearing manner (p. 77) and conclude that: ‘Lest one be tempted to condemn the parts maker, 
recall the many stories in the business press of how some automakers have abused the trust 
and investment of their suppliers. Opportunism can run both ways.’ (ibid). Thus, this case 
may well be another example of apparently opportunistic behaviour actually resulting from a 
self-defence reaction to prevent the breach of a conflicting principle. If so, then once more, it 
did not constitute a supplier-based threat to the buyer’s interests, and hence did not require 
significant management attention to control the supplier’s behaviour.  
 
Mitrega & Zolkiewski (2012) claim to identify opportunism on the part of an Internet 
infrastructure provider in a case: “The first contract ended and we continued dealing with 
each other. After a while I got reliable information from my colleague from another company 
that … is offering much better terms of contract to new customers. These customers had 
better quality and more additional services at the same price … When we contacted …. they 
said that these are special terms for new customers and maybe we can have just 10% discount 
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… Only when we discussed the possibility of not lengthening the contract did they finally 
agree to providing us the same terms”. (p. 891). This behaviour would only constitute 
opportunism if there was a market norm for suppliers to tell buyers the prices paid by all 
other customers. No such norm exists in most markets, and consequently this more closely 
resembles an example of competitive negotiating practice. The authors also suggest that the 
‘Worsening of negotiation position…’ and a supplier becoming ‘less oriented to my 
individual situation and more at procedures and documentation” (p. 890) are examples of 
passive opportunism - that is the: ‘…shirking or evasion of obligations in the ongoing 
relationship.’ Or ‘…one of the parties to the exchange …purposely withholding effort…’ 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000, 38). However, precisely the same supplier behaviours could have 
been motivated by a variety of factors other than opportunism, such as staffing problems, 
incompetence, changes in strategic objectives, unexpected demands from other strategically 
critical customers and so on. An unequivocal identification of opportunism is thus 
impossible.  
 
On the other hand, the same authors describe an apparently clear example of Overt-
opportunism committed by a coal supplier who: ‘…used blackmail in terms of not supplying 
coal at the contracted price.’ (Mitrega & Zolkiewski, 2012, 890). One other case that may be 
an example of Overt-opportunism can be found in Wathne & Heide (2000) who cite Klein 
(1996) and the relationship between General Motors and a supplier in 1926 described in 
Klein et al. (1978). A close reading of that original study reveals a supplier extracting as 
much profit as possible within the terms of an agreed contract. Since there is no mention of 
cheating, lying, the deliberate distortion of information or treachery of any kind this may be a 
case of Overt-opportunism possibly violating the norm of distributive justice. 
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Finally, Cadden et al. (2015) show that transactional mechanisms at a strategic level led to 
opportunistic behaviour. A buying organisations used price renegotiation (by threatening with 
the use of substitute from alternative suppliers) when buying volumes increased and suppliers 
reciprocated this behaviour by trying to alter contract and relationship terms when buyer 
volumes decreased. 
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Reviewer comments and responses: 
Opportunism in buyer-supplier exchange: a critical examination of the concept and its implications 
for theory and practice. 
We would like to thank the reviewers, who have taken a considerable amount of time to read and 
then provide a set of detailed and insightful comments on our revised submission. We have 
incorporated these and feel that they have helped us to further improve our paper. Please find our 
responses to reviewers in the table below and we have made any changes to the paper itself in red, 
as per the journal requirements. In addition, we have gone through the publisher layout guide and, 
in accordance with this document, the main body of the work is now fully in Times New Roman, 12 
point and double-spaced and the headings/sub-headings are in alignment. 
 
Comments Response 
I would recommend that you add 'guile' to the 
keywords to emphasise that this is where your 
contribution lies. 
‘Guile’ has been added to the keywords. 
I am not convinced that switching to the first 
person at the end of the first paragraph in the 
introduction works. I feel that explanation would 
be better in the third person. 
This part of the Introduction has now been 
changed into the third person. 
I am also not convinced that the text "and our 
main argument would be lost by including other 
theoretical explanations" is needed here. It 
seems out of place, you should always be able 
to make your argument with clarity. 
This text has now been deleted and the 
sentence has been amended to show a more 
direct focus on our specific contribution based 
on the concepts of guile. 
Throughout I would expect you to always cite 
the year when you cite an author's name, there 
are numerous places where the year is not cited 
for Williamson, Wathne & Heide and Macneil, 
for example. 
This has been corrected throughout the article. 
On page 3 you state "Through an evaluation of 
direct and indirect evidence this paper argues 
that Williamson’s original definition of 
opportunism with guile is not as common as 
academic literature purports it to be." I am 
rather confused by this statement, would this be 
better phrased "Enactment of Williamson's 
(year) definition....." 
We have changed this sentence accordingly and 
it now reads much more clearly. 
Pg. 13, line 56 'paper' should be 'papers'. We have made this change. 
You need to check all the cross-references to 
the tables, a number are incorrect. 
All the tables are now accurately cross-
referenced throughout the paper.    
A cross-reference to the appropriate tables 
would be useful at the beginning of section 3.3 
and 4.1 
Additional text has been added to the start of 
these sections to highlight the specific tables 
being referred to. In addition, similar insertions 
have been made at other relevant points of the 
paper. 
Pg. 28, lines 16/17 'includes' should be 'include'. We have made this change. 
Section 4.2 remains long-winded and difficult to 
read through. Would it not be possible to add 
We have reviewed this section thoroughly and 
agree that it is long-winded. Therefore, we 
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some of this material to Table 5, then a more 
succinct discussion provided. 
have merged small parts of the second 
paragraph with the first as these were 
effectively dealing with the same point. Overall, 
in this section we have now adopted shorter 
paragraphs to make it more succinct and easier 
to follow and have also removed any 
extraneous aspects of the paragraphs 
themselves.  
While the new subheadings in the discussion 
help with the structure, this key section remains 
rather long and unwieldy. Please try to make this 
discussion much more 'punchy'. 
We have removed a paragraph from this 
section, which did cover a number of additional 
examples and on reviewing this we felt it was 
not adding anything significant to the 
argument. In addition, we have also created a 
separate conclusions and contributions section 
that provides a clearer focus on the research 
questions and makes the preceding section 
shorter and less unwieldly.  
You need to add more supporting citations for 
the counter points you raise throughout the 
paper, but especially on pg. 31 lines 12-19. 
As part of our review of section 4.2 (as per 
above), this specific section has now been 
integrated into the section 4.4 (summary of 
discussion) and we have now provided 
supporting citations, primarily linking the 
argument to Kraljic’s portfolio approach and 
the rise in outsourcing. We hope these more 
fully underpin the points we are making. 
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Concept Behaviour Illustrative example 
Overt opportunism 
 
 
The open pursuit of 
advantage or benefit by one 
party to an exchange at the 
expense of their trading 
opposite(s). 
The supplier forces a price 
increase through without 
offering any justification. 
 
Opportunism-with-
guile 
 
 
The hidden pursuit of 
advantage or benefit, with 
the deliberate intent to 
deceive, by one party to an 
exchange at the expense of 
their trading opposite(s). 
The supplier requests a 
price increase citing 
deliberately distorted data 
in justification, and hides 
the distortion. 
 
Table 1 – Example of the overt and with-guile forms of opportunism (source – authors) 
 
Operations Management 
 
Journal of Operations Management, International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, Production, Planning and Control, Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, Supply Chain Management an International Journal, Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, Journal of Production and Operations Management, Journal of Production 
Economics, International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, Journal 
of Business logistics, International Journal of Logistics Management, Decision Sciences, 
European Journal of Operational Research 
 
Marketing 
 
Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of International Marketing, Psychology and 
Marketing, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Marketing 
Letters, Marketing Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Marketing, 
European Journal of Marketing 
 
Other managerial areas 
 
Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, British Journal of Management, Journal of Management 
 
Table 2 – Relevant journals referring to the concept of opportunism 
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Citation Context Opportunistic 
Behaviour 
Alternative Explanation 
Cox & 
Thompson 
(1997 
Construction 
industry 
Adversarial 
relationships 
encourage 
opportunism: 
Increasing annual 
turnover through 
contractual claims 
Many reasons why 
construction companies 
present contractual claims 
such as dealing with poor 
management; inaccurate 
forecasts; inaccurate 
information. 
Anderson 
et al. 
(2000) 
US car firms and die 
manufacturers 
No evidence of buyer 
opportunism, but 
evidence of suppliers 
causing delays that 
could have been 
attributed to 
opportunism 
External suppliers do 
more work to perfect the 
dies than internal 
suppliers.  This takes 
longer, hence delays. 
Wathne 
and Heide 
(2000) 
Ford and supplier 
Lear Corp. 
Supplier failed to 
honour promises. 
Fords explanation of the 
supplier’s behaviour was 
that rather than displaying 
opportunism, Lear was 
suffering from poor 
management. 
Anderson 
and Jap 
(2005) 
Car firm and Parts 
supplier. 
Supplier reduces the 
number of coats of 
paint to cut costs of 
unit price. 
Evidence of Buyer using 
power over supplier.  
Apparently opportunistic 
behaviour is a result of 
self-defence. 
Mitrega 
and 
Zolkiewski 
(2012) 
Internet 
infrastructure 
provider 
Offering better terms, 
quality and additional 
services to new 
customers at the same 
price as the long term 
customer.   
There is no market norm 
for suppliers to tell buyers 
the prices paid by all 
other customers.  
Mitrega 
and 
Zolkiewski 
(2012) 
Coal supplier  Coal supplier not 
supplying coal at the 
contracted price 
Close reading of the 
contract showed that the 
supplier was operating 
within the terms of the 
contractual agreement.  
There was no cheating or 
deliberate distortion of 
information. 
Cadden et 
al. (2015) 
Telecommunications The buying firm 
threatened to use a 
substitute from an 
alternative supplier 
Traditional mechanism  
tactics in renegotiations 
 
Table 3 – Summary of direct evidence cases 
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Source Context Respond
ents 
Opp. mean 
(Likert scale 
format) 
Mean 
at or 
below 
mid-
point 
of scale 
(freq.) 
Rank of 
opp. mean 
in study 
Opp. as 
dependent 
variable 
Self-
report 
or 
others 
   Supplier 
Opportunism 
    
Handley 
& 
Benton, 
2012 
 
Large US 
based 
companies 
with 
domestic  and 
/or offshore 
business 
processes. 
Suppliers 1.43, 1.40, 
1.33, 1.75, 
1.51, 1.50, 
1.29, 1.26, 
1.43 
(7 point) 
9 Lowest Y Self 
Lui & 
Ngo, 
2012 
 
Trading 
companies in 
garment and 
toy industries 
in Hong 
Kong and 
suppliers in 
China. 
Buyers 2.8 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Yang et 
al. 2011 
Manufacturin
g firms 
covering a 
wide range of 
industries, 
electronics, 
computer 
equipment, 
chemicals, 
apparel, 
furniture, 
food and 
textiles in 
China. 
Buyers 2.46, 3.62 
(7 point)  
2 Lowest N Others 
Yen & 
Barnes, 
2011 
Anglo - 
Taiwanese 
buyer – seller  
firms. 
Buyers 3.07, 2.96, 
2.88, 2.93 
(7 point) 
4 Lowest Y Others 
Samaha 
et al. 
2011 
Fortune 500 
firm (seller) 
and its 
resellers 
Buyers 2.23 
(5 point) 
1 Second 
lowest 
N Others 
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(Channel 
members). 
Sectors 
included 
appliances, 
automotive, 
clothing, 
electronics, 
computers, 
sport etc. 
Barthéle
my, 2011 
French 
franchise 
chains. 
Buyers 3.49 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Barnes et 
al. 2010 
Western 
exporters 
from US, 
Canada, GB, 
Ireland, 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
and 
importing 
firms based 
in Hong 
Kong. 
Buyers 2.96, 3.16, 
3.00, 3.28 
(7 point) 
4 Second 
lowest 
Y Others 
Ghosh & 
John, 
2009 
US 
engineering 
intensive 
industry 
sectors. 
Buyers 3.13 
(7 point) 
1 Second 
lowest 
N Others 
Lui et al. 
2009 
 
Hong Kong 
trading firms 
and Chinese 
suppliers. 
Buyers 2.9 
(5 point) 
1 Equal 
lowest 
N Others 
Lado et 
al. 2008 
US catalogue 
intermediarie
s affiliated 
with a large 
retail firm. 
Buyers 2.24 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Palmatie
r et al. 
2007 
Business to 
business 
relationships 
between a 
major 
Fortune 500 
company 
(seller) and 
its local 
distributor 
agents.  
Buyers 2.06, 2.13 
(5 point) 
1 2
nd
 lowest N Others 
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Businesses 
cover 
products 
including 
clothing, 
hardware, 
furniture and 
appliances. 
Heide et 
al. 2007 
Business to 
Business 
relationships 
between 
manufacturer
s (suppliers) 
of building 
materials 
(doors, 
windows, 
frames, stairs, 
roofing 
products) and 
their 
downstream 
buyers. 
Suppliers 1.38, 1.56 
(7 point) 
2 Lowest N Self 
Morgan 
et al. 
2007 
UK 
supermarket 
retailers 
Buyers 2.98 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Carson 
et al. 
2006 
Outsourced 
R&D 
relationships 
in new 
product 
development 
in US 
Buyers NB 13.81/28 
(responses 
summed not 
averaged) 
1 Middle 
 
N Others 
Wuyts & 
Geysken
s, 2005 
Small to 
medium sized 
firms in 
Industrial and 
commercial 
machinery, 
computer 
equipment, 
electronic, 
electrical 
equipment 
and 
components 
in the 
Netherlands. 
Buyers 1.99 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Rokkan Building Buyers 1.44 1 Lowest Y Others 
Page 68 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tppc E-mail: ppc@plymouth.ac.uk
Production Planning & Control
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
et al. 
2003 
material 
manufacturer
s and 
distributors. 
(7 point) 
Skarmea
s et al. 
2002 
Importing 
distributors 
purchasing 
directly from 
overseas. 
Sectors: 
textiles, pulp 
and paper, 
chemicals, 
machinery 
and electrical 
machinery. 
Buyers 2.63 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Dorsch 
et al. 
1998 
Random 
sample of 
purchasing 
executives in 
the US 
Buyers 2.15, 2.32, 
3.05 
(6 point) 
3 Lowest- 2
nd
 
lowest 
 
N Self 
Lee, 
1998 
Australian 
exporters and 
foreign 
exchange 
partners. 
Suppliers 2.1 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
        
   Buyer 
 Opportunism 
    
Kashyap 
et al. 
2012 
US 
automotive 
manufacturer
s and their 
dealers. 
Buyers 
 
2.32 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
Noordho
ff et al. 
2011 
Dutch 
business to 
business 
innovation 
relationships. 
Suppliers 2.84 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Dev et 
al. 2011 
Large hotel 
firms in 
North 
America. 
Buyers 1.99 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
Ju et al. 
2011 
Export 
ventures in 
China 
Suppliers 2.42 
(5 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Liu et al. 
2010b 
 
Buyer- 
supplier 
relationships 
in the context 
Suppliers 3.25 
(7 point) 
1 Second 
Lowest 
Y Others 
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of Chinese 
household 
appliances. 
Wong et 
al. 2005 
Manufacturer
s and 
suppliers 
various 
industries in 
Shanghai. 
Suppliers 2.62 
(5 point) 
1 Second 
Lowest 
Y Others 
Cavusgil 
et al. 
2004 
US based 
manufacturer
s and 
independent 
foreign 
distributers. 
Suppliers 3.887, 4.262, 
4.543, 4.585, 
5.072 
(7 point) 
1 Mixed Y Others 
Jap, 
2003 
Supply base 
of a major 
firm in the 
automotive 
industry 
involved in 
on-line 
reverse 
auctions. 
Suppliers 2.94 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Others 
Brown et 
al. 2000 
US Hotel 
Industry. 
Buyers 2.232 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest Y Self 
Dahlstro
m & 
Nygaard, 
1999 
Norwegian 
franchisee-
franchisor 
relationships 
in the oil 
industry. 
Buyers 3.06 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Provan 
& 
Skinner, 
1989 
Farm and 
Power 
equipment 
dealers and 
primary 
supplier 
organisations 
in US. 
Buyers 2.52 
(6 point) 
1 2nd lowest Y Self 
        
   Both Buyer 
and Supplier 
Opportunism 
    
Caniëls 
& 
Gelderm
an, 2010 
Information 
and 
communicati
on 
Technology 
professionals  
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
Suppliers: 2.54 
Buyers: 2.03 
(5 point) 
2 Second 
Lowest 
Lowest 
Y Both 
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Table 4 - Empirical results: Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Exchange 
 
 
 
 
Question Question (principles being violated in bold) Frequency 
with which the 
in Dutch 
local 
government. 
Liu et al. 
2010a 
Distributors 
and 
Manufacturer
s in Chinese 
household 
appliances. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
4.31 
(7 point) 
0 Lowest N Self 
Liu et al. 
2009 
 
Household 
appliance 
manufacturer
s and 
distributors in 
China. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
4.09 
(7 point) 
0 Second 
Lowest 
Y 
 
Others 
Tokman 
et al. 
2007 
Greek SME, 
3PL 
providers. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
3.08 
(5 point) 
0 Second 
lowest 
N Others 
Kneyme
yer & 
Murphy, 
2005 
Users and 
Providers of 
3PL services 
in US. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
Suppliers: 4.0 
Buyers: 3.1 
1 Second and 
third lowest 
N Others 
Jap & 
Anderso
n, 2003 
Procurement 
division of 4 
large 
equipment 
manufacturer
s in 
computing, 
photography, 
chemicals 
and brewing. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
2.15 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
Jap, 
2001 
Retailers and 
manufactures 
in chemical 
industry. 
Buyers 
and 
suppliers 
2.2 
(7 point) 
1 Lowest N Others 
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question has 
been used  
 The [trading opposite]:  
 Honouring contracts/promises  
1 sometimes promises to do things without actually doing them later. 19 
2 breaches formal or informal agreements to their benefit. 15 
3 does not always act in accordance with our contract(s).  6 
4 fails to deliver promises, as described in the contract, for its own 
interests. 
1 
 Truth Telling  
5 alters the facts in order to get what they need. 22 
6 lies about certain things in order to protect its interests. 19 
7 exaggerates needs to get what they desire 11 
8 does not provide a completely truthful picture when negotiating 9 
9 has presented facts in such a way that has made them look good. 6 
10 seems to believe that honesty does not pay when dealing with 
partners 
4 
11 makes false accusations 3 
12 is candid with us (reverse scored) 2 
 Maintaining equity/distributive justice  
13 will try to take advantage of “holes” in our contract to further their 
own interests. 
7 
14 feels it is OK to do anything within its means that will help further 
its own interests. 
7 
15 avoids fulfilling their responsibilities unless they are watched 6 
16 uses unexpected events to extract concessions from our firm. 5 
17 has benefited from our relationship to our detriment. 4 
18 withholds important information from us. 4 
19 fails to provide us with the support they are obliged to 4 
20 is unwilling to accept responsibility 3 
21 expects my firm to pay for more than their fair share of the costs to 
correct a problem 
2 
22 usually register a complaint if our company fails to meet our 
cooperative agreements 
1 
23 expects to receive an unreasonably large share of the benefits from 
our cooperative agreements  
1 
24 tries to renegotiate contracts to its own advantage 1 
25 tends to escalate cost estimates as projects progress 1  
26 is less and less cooperative as projects progress 1 
27 is reluctant to accept changes without receiving concessions and 
compromises 
1 
28 abuses displays of honesty on our part 1 
29 has coerced us unfairly in order to gain accessions 1 
30 is aloof toward us 1 
31 fails to provide proper notification 1 
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 Observing bargaining norms  
32 does not negotiate from a good faith bargaining perspective 6 
 Avoiding shirking  
 If [the customer] were not able to detect it, how likely are members 
of our organization to… 
 
33 not assign your best people to your business or account with [the 
customer] ? 
1 
34 provide a lower than agreed to level of resources? 1 
35 withhold information that may be beneficial to [the customer]? 1 
36 not share the benefits of process improvements? 1 
37 delay making agreed to investments in employee training? 1 
38 delay making agreed to investments in new technology? 1 
 Avoiding poaching  
 If [the customer] were not able to detect it, how likely are members 
of our organization to… 
 
39 use potentially proprietary information obtained through your 
relationship with [the customer] to gain favor with other clients? 
1 
40 use potentially proprietary information obtained through your 
relationship with [the customer] to help win business with other 
customers? 
1 
41 use potentially proprietary information obtained through your 
relationship with [the customer] to develop new services that you 
can offer in the marketplace? 
1 
 Avoiding deceit  
42 has tried to deceive us on several occasions 1  
 
Table 5 – Generic questions in empirical surveys 
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